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Is warrant really a derivative?  
Evidence from the Chinese warrant market 
Abstract 
This paper studies the Chinese warrant market that has been developed since August 2005. 
Empirical evidence shows that the market prices of warrants are much higher systematically than 
the Black-Scholes prices with historical volatility. The prices of a warrant and its underlying asset 
do not support the monotonicity, perfect correlation and option redundancy properties. The 
cumulated delta-hedged gains for almost all expired warrants are negative. The negative gains are 
mainly driven by the volatility risk, and the trading values of the warrants for puts and the market 
risk for calls. The investors are trading some other risks in addition to the underlying risk.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I  Introduction  
This paper documents the anomaly of the Chinese warrant market that has been developed 
since August 2005. We find that the market prices of warrants are generally much higher 
systematically than the Black-Scholes prices and provide evidence that warrants in China in these 
embryo years could not be effectively replicated by the underlying assets and hence were unlikely 
to be an effective hedging tool. Therefore, while carrying the same name, warrants in China 
markets can hardly be viewed as a conventional option-like derivative. The success of the market 
must be attributed to the possibility that it met economic needs other than hedging and risk 
management. Particularly, we examine the extent to which the China warrant and underlying 
prices conform to the one-dimensional diffusion model, study the cumulated gains of a 
delta-hedged warrant portfolio, and conduct investigation into what economic variables may 
account for these negative delta-hedging gains. We contribute to the literature by offering a 
systematic empirical study of the most active warrant derivative market worldwide, which also 
happens to be the youngest of its kind. This is of no surprise as, in the absence of a short-sale 
mechanism, arbitrage trading in this market is essentially impossible. The evidence reinforces this 
fundamental intuition and offers a useful reference to regulatory agencies of other emerging 
financial markets.  
The literature on studying the Chinese warrant market is scarce. Xiong and Yu (2011) 
observe bubbles in the market by focusing on put warrants in 2005-2008. They also use the data 
to test bubble theories and show evidence of the experimental bubble. Wu (2011) further studies 
the Chinese warrants bubble by using both put and call warrants in 2005-2009. He finds that the 
bubble size is related to turnover, daily price change, and the total number of warrants outstanding. 
Powers, Xiao, and Yan (2009) use adjusted Black-Scholes model, jump-diffusion model and 
constant elasticity of variance model to examine pricing errors in the Chinese warrants. They 
argue that unique settlement rule is an important factor for the mispricing in the warrants and 
investors were willing to pay a premium for put warrants to get a convenience yield. 
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The methodology of our main empirical tests was proposed and used by Bakshi, Cao and 
Chen (2000) in which they examine whether or not the one-dimensional diffusion model applies 
in the S&P 500 index options market. The one-dimensional diffusion model is also known as the 
local (deterministic) volatility model and was independently developed by Derman and Kani 
(1994a, b), Dupire (1994), and Rubinstein (1994). An important implication of one-dimensional 
diffusion models is that the derivative price depends only on the prices of its underlying assets. 
Examples of one-dimensional diffusion models include the classical Black and Scholes (1973), 
Merton (1973), and the Cox and Ross (1976) constant elasticity of variance (CEV) model. Bakshi, 
Cao and Chen (2000) argue that any one-dimensional diffusion model must satisfy three 
properties: monotonicity, perfect correlation and redundancy between warrant and its underlying 
prices. If the prices of a warrant market systematically violate any of the three properties, one 
may conclude that the one-dimensional diffusion model does not apply in this market. Following 
the idea, we first test whether the China warrant prices follow the Black-Scholes formula with 
historical volatility. We then perform comprehensive tests on the monotonic, perfect correlation 
and redundant relationships between the warrant and the underlying prices for all 30 available 
expired warrants. We find that the market prices of warrants are much higher systematically than 
the Black-Scholes prices with historical volatility and document ample evidence that the 
one-dimensional diffusion model does not apply well in the Chinese warrant market. 
Further, we study the cumulated gains of a delta-hedged warrant portfolio by following 
Bakshi and Kapadia (2003a, b). We find that the cumulated gains are negative for 27 out of 30 
expired warrants. While Bakshi and Kapadia (2003a) also document a negative average 
delta-hedging gain in the S&P 500 options market, the magnitude of the average gains in the 
Chinese warrant market is a few hundred times larger than those reported in the U.S. market. The 
extremely poor hedging performance further confirms the inapplicability conclusion of the 
one-dimensional diffusion model tests. Moreover, we conduct investigation into what economic 
variables may account for these daily delta-hedging gains. The regression results suggest that the 
negative gains are significantly related to the market index return volatility, the underlying stock 
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return volatility, the daily trading value of warrants (for puts), and the market risk (for calls). 
The split share structure reform of listed companies in China triggered the launch of the 
Chinese warrant market in 2005. Since the listing of Baosteel warrant (580000), the first of its 
kind, on August 22, 2005, the China domestic investors have been overwhelmingly passionate 
about the warrants on equities and the market has made remarkable achievements. According to 
Goldman Sachs, the total warrant turnover in China’s stock exchanges was USD250.5 billion in 
2006, compared with USD230.4 billion in Hong Kong and USD124.3 billion in Germany. In 
2006 and 2007, the warrant markets in China, Hong Kong and Germany were ranked the top three 
in the world in terms of trading value and turnover. It is an amazing record since there were only 
17 warrants being traded in two exchanges in China at the end of November 2007, compared with 
4,394 in Hong Kong and 270,254 in Germany. The Chinese warrant market created top trading 
volume and turnover with only a handful of different warrants traded. 
If trading volume is a proper yardstick, then the record speaks for itself that the development 
of the China warrant market has been a huge success. Therefore, while failing to be an effective 
hedging tool, one must admit that these financial assets have met some other important economic 
demand. One such possibility is the speculative demand. As up to now, equity trading on margin 
of any form is still prohibited in China. Derivatives enable investors to trade on information that 
otherwise might be prohibitively expensive to trade on. Call warrants, for example, have 
characteristics similar to levered positions in the underlying asset. They allow investors to assume 
the same risk of the underlying asset with a relatively small investment. Likewise, with put 
warrants, investors can more easily take advantage of negative information about the underlying 
assets when faced with short-sale constraints. We suspect that facilitating trades on either positive 
or negative information in a relatively cheap manner could have contributed to the large demand. 
If it is so, the availability of these new financial instruments might somewhat has enhanced the 
completeness of the China financial markets.  
The overwhelmingly large trading volume and turnover render a systematic study on the 
Chinese warrant market an important task in its own right. However, what is more important for 
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such a study is that China launched the warrant market at a time when short-sales of any financial 
assets were not allowed in the markets. The lack of such a crucial mechanism makes a low-cost 
perfect replication of derivatives by other financial assets impossible. As a result, no risk-free 
arbitrage force arguably exists to exploit any possible mis-alignment between the prices of the 
warrants and the underlying assets, rendering the possibility that warrants are priced by 
mechanisms other than those suggested by conventional derivative theories.  
However, when a huge speculative demand is present and a cheap risk-free arbitrage 
mechanism is absent, one still could not entirely eliminate the possibility that the huge trading 
volume and the extraordinary price volatility exhibited in some trades are simply a manifestation 
of the resale option theory of bubbles. This idea was first proposed by Harrison and Kreps (1978) 
and recently applied to the China warrant market by Xiong and Yu (2011). We also observed that 
some very deep out-of-the-money warrants were created by qualified issuers with a hardly 
justifiable price and were actively traded by retail investors. Indeed, there were incidents in which 
securities firms made significant profits by selling “zero value” put warrants to retail investors. 
The evident is consistent with the claim that a speculative bubble to some extent existed in this 
embryo market. Perhaps undercurrent forces, market completion enhancement and speculative 
frenzy have played a role in creating the phenomenal trading volume. This should be an 
interesting future research issue. It is clear from this study that warrants in general are not 
redundant assets in the China capital markets as evidence shows that the conditions of the 
one-dimensional diffusion model were frequently violated and the investors were trading some 
other risks in addition to the underlying risk. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section II introduces the history and 
current situation of the Chinese warrant market. Section III describes the data. Section IV presents 
empirical results. Section V concludes the paper. 
 
II  Warrant and the Chinese warrant market 
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2.1.Warrants 
Warrants are the call or put options written by the issuer of underlying securities or by a third 
party, entitling their holders to purchase (call) or sell (put) the underlying securities from or to the 
issuer, or collect the price difference by cash settlement, at a predetermined price at any time 
during a specified period or on a specified expiry date. Hereinafter, unless otherwise specified, 
warrant refers to call warrant. Warrants can be divided into two categories based on the type of 
issuers: equity warrants and covered warrants. Equity warrants are issued by the issuers of the 
underlying stocks (usually the listed companies), whereas covered warrants are issued by an 
independent third party (usually financial institutions such as investment banks). The detailed 
differences between equity warrants and covered warrants are listed in Table 1. 
 
2.2. Overview of the Chinese warrant market 
Warrants were launched in the mainland China financial market as early as the 1990s, not 
long after China established the stock market. The Da Feile warrant, the first of its kind, was 
issued in Shanghai in June 1992. During the 1990s, there were 14 warrants in total in the Chinese 
market. However, the issuance of warrants was abolished later by the regulator due to rampant 
speculation and market manipulation. The reintroduction and development of Chinese warrant 
market in 2005 was a result of the split share structure reform of listed companies. For example, 
Baoshan Iron & Steel Co. was the first company to issue the warrants as part of a plan to 
compensate its investors for allowing the companies’ non-tradable shares to be listed on the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange. More specifically, for every 10 shares held, minority shareholders 
were given 2.2 bonus shares and one warrant giving them the option to buy one share for 4.5 yuan, 
or about 56 U.S. cents, within a specified time.  
Currently all stock trades in the Chinese financial market are settled on the next business day 
following a transaction, which is called “T+1”. Only warrants trades are allowed to be settled on 
the same day of a transaction, and is called “T+0”. Allowing investors to buy and sell securities 
on the same day (intraday trading) provides investors with greater flexibility to take advantage of 
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short-term swings in security prices. Due to the scarcity of “T+0” investment instruments, 
combined with other reasons such as transaction cost and price change limits, Baosteel warrants 
and all the other subsequent warrants soon became one of the favorite products of Chinese 
investors.  
Until March 14, 2008 (the end of our sample period), 47 warrants have been traded in either 
the Shanghai or the Shenzhen Stock Exchanges. Among these warrants, 30 were expired, and 17 
were still being traded at that point in time. These 47 warrants contain 28 covered warrants and 19 
equity warrants. The detailed information for each warrant is listed in the Appendix. 
 
2.3. The warrant creation mechanism in the Chinese warrant market  
In developed markets like Hong Kong or Germany, all of the standard warrant products 
adopt the mechanism of "continuous creation" which allows issuers or other qualified institutions 
to add to the supply of warrants at any time. When launching the second (Wuhan Steel call 
580001) and the third (Wuhan Steel put 580999) warrants, Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) 
released the "Notice of Relevant Issues concerning Securities Companies' Creation of Wuhan 
Steel Warrants", which stated that the securities companies with the innovation pilot qualification 
of the Securities Association of China are eligible to create new warrants. The warrant creation 
mechanism has been in place since then. This creation mechanism means that after a warrant is 
issued in the split share structure reform of listed companies, qualified securities companies 
(creators) may create warrants with the same specification as the original ones traded in the 
market. The creation involves writing a new contract and selling it to the market, which increases 
the supply and stabilizes the price. The creators may cancel the warrant by repurchasing it from 
the market. For the cancellation, the creator who applies to cancel warrants, upon approval of the 
SSE, and after buying back a certain amount of warrants, should notify the Shanghai Branch of 
China Securities Depository and Clearing Corporation Limited (CSDC) to cancel the warrants on 
the very day and unfreeze the corresponding shares or capital on the next day.  
Warrant prices in the Chinese market are usually much higher than their theoretical values. 
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This was especially so in the two-year bull market (2006 and 2007). Even a deeply 
out-of-the-money put could still have a high price. It brings to those securities companies, who 
are qualified to create warrants, opportunities to make huge profits from the creation of warrants. 
So far only those securities companies with innovation pilot qualification awarded by the 
Securities Association of China are qualified to create warrants, and domestic investors call these 
companies “innovative securities companies” (innovation pilot securities dealers). In this situation, 
even if the market price of warrants is abnormally high, only these “innovative securities 
companies” may earn abnormal profit from taking short positions. 
 
III  Data 
In this section, we introduce the data. The dataset employed in this study is from Wind Info, 
a leading financial data provider in Mainland China. We use all of the 30 warrants that expired 
before March 14, 2008. The sample period is from August 22, 2005 to March 14, 2008. The data 
cover daily warrants closing prices, trading volume and trading value. The data for the underlying 
stocks and Shanghai Composite Index cover open, high, low and close prices, trading volume and 
trading value. The time window of the underlying stocks data is one or two years longer than the 
warrant data for the purpose of computing historical volatility. We use CNY benchmark deposit 
rates of financial institutions released by the People's Bank of China as the risk-free rate. Note 
that Bakshi, Cao and Chen (2000) study the S&P 500 index options market by using intraday data. 
In the Chinese warrant market, some warrants, especially put warrants, are traded so actively that 
their trading is forced to be suspended by the exchanges for several hours on certain days, while 
the underlying stocks are still traded during this period. Due to the time inconsistency in intraday 
data between the warrants and their underlying stocks, we use daily data. 
 
3.1. Summary statistics of the Chinese warrant market 
Table 2 shows the average daily trading volume/value of all the 30 expired warrants and their 
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underlying stocks during the lifetime of the warrants, the average daily price/time value (market 
and Black-Scholes), and the daily average volatility in addition. We find that for all of the 
warrants, except Wanhua HXB1 (580005), the average daily trading volume/value of the warrants 
is significantly higher than that of their underlying stocks. In some cases, such as Hansteel JTB1 
(580003), it can be ten times higher. Market price and time value computed from market price are  
generally much higher systematically than the Black-Scholes ones. Implied volatility is also 
significantly higher than historical volatility at 1% level. 
 
3.2. A comparison between the market price and the Black-Scholes price 
Figure 1a shows the market prices and Black-Scholes prices with historical volatility of the 
“typical” warrant, Baosteel JTB1 (580000). The historical volatility on any date is computed as 
the standard deviation of log stock price returns in a moving window of fixed length. The length 
of the moving window is determined as the time to expiration of the warrant at its initial trading 
date. From Figure 1a, we observe that the market prices of warrants are generally much higher 
than their Black-Scholes prices. This phenomenon is significant for four put warrants: Zhaohang 
CMP1 (580997), Hualing JTP1 (038003), Zhongji ZYP1 (038006) and Jiafei JTP1 (038008). 
During the period between the end of May 2007 (“5.30 market crash”1) and the beginning of July 
2007, as short-term deeply out-of-the-money puts, the values of these four warrants were 
supposed to be zero. However, their market prices were unreasonably high. In this situation, the 
“innovative securities companies” (innovation pilot securities dealers), who are qualified to create 
warrants, made huge arbitrage profit by creating and selling these deeply out-of-the-money put 
warrants to the market. 
Figure 1b shows a comparison between the daily trading value of the warrants and that of 
their underlying stocks. We find that the daily trading value of the warrants is consistently higher 
                                                 
1 On May 30, 2007, Chinese Ministry of Finance raised the stamp tax from 0.1% to 0.3%. The unexpected sharp 
rise of the transaction cost caused the markets to crash in both the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock market. Put 
warrants were the only instruments in the market for investors to take short position under the short-sale 
constraints. So the investors became passionate in trading those existing put warrants at that time, such as the 
four put warrants mentioned before. 
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than that of their underlying stocks. We offer the following explanations: (1) In order to take 
advantage of short-term swings of the asset price, domestic investors prefer products that have 
“T+0” mechanism which mentioned in section II. This motivates investors to trade warrants 
actively. According to a statistics by the Shanghai Stock Exchange, 80% of the warrant trading 
volume was induced by the “T+0” mechanism. (2) There is no stamp tax on warrant trading, 
whereas 0.1%-0.3% stamp tax is imposed on stock trading. The low transaction cost is another 
attractive aspect of warrant trading. (3) Warrants have different daily price fluctuation limits from 
underlying stocks. While the limits for daily price changes of stock trading are 10% up or down, 
the fluctuation scale of warrants can be much wider than that of the underlying stocks. 
Figure 2 shows the market prices, Black-Scholes prices and trading value of Zhaohang 
CMP1 (580997) as an example of the four put warrants mentioned above. They were heavily 
over-priced a few months before the maturity dates. It is interesting to observe that their market 
prices are highly correlated with their trading values. This phenomenon indicates that the 
over-pricing of the four put warrants was driven by the frenetic speculation in the market. We will 
come back to this point when presenting our regression results of delta-hedged gains. 
 
3.3. A comparison between time values computed from the market price and that from the 
Black-Scholes price 
For those deeply in-the-money call warrants, such as Wanhua HXB1 (580005), Yager QCB1 
(580006), Yili CWB1 (580009), Qiaocheng HQC1 (031001) and Shenfa SFC1 (031003), their 
market prices look very close to their Black-Scholes prices, due to their large intrinsic values. The 
intrinsic value for European options (warrants) is defined as  for call, and max( ,0)rS Ke τ−−
max( ,0)rKe Sτ− −  for put, where  is the underlying stock price, S K  is the strike price,  is 
the risk-free rate, and  is the time to maturity. In order to observe the difference between 
market and Black-Scholes prices more clearly, we should study their time values. The time value 
of a warrant is defined as the difference between its market (Black-Scholes) price and its intrinsic 
r
τ
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value.  
Figure 3a shows the time values computed from the market and Black-Scholes prices of the 
“typical” warrant, Zhonghua CWB1 (580011). We observe that the time value of call warrants 
computed from market price is higher than that computed from the Black-Scholes price. 
Sometimes certain call warrants have negative time values, which indicates that they are 
underpriced at this moment. The time value of put warrants computed from market price is 
usually much higher than that computed from the Black-Scholes price. 
 
3.4. A comparison between implied volatility and historical volatility 
To further quantify the misprice of a warrant, we compare its implied volatility with its 
historical volatility. Figure 3b shows a comparison between implied volatilities and historical 
volatilities of the “typical” warrant, Zhonghua CWB1 (580011). For some warrants, such as Yili 
CWB1 (580009) and Zhonghua CWB1 (580011), the implied volatility cannot be computed on 
certain dates due to the fact that their market prices are lower than their intrinsic values on these 
days.  
From Figure 3b, we observe that the implied volatility of call warrants is around 100%-300%, 
which is much higher than historical volatility (around 40%). The implied volatility of put 
warrants is even higher, up to 1000%, increasing dramatically as the maturity date approaches. 
This is because the deeply out-of-the-money put warrants were still traded with a certain price a 
couple days before the maturity dates. 
 
IV  Empirical Results 
In this section, we empirically examine violations of market observations to the predictions 
of one-dimensional diffusion models, compute the excess gain of a delta-hedged warrant, and 
explore the hidden factors that drive the dynamics of the gain. A delta-hedged portfolio is: (1) a 
long call position, hedged by a short position in the underlying stock, or (2) a long put position, 
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hedged by a long position in the underlying stock, with the net investment earning the risk-free 
rate. The methodologies used mainly follow that of Bakshi, Cao and Chen (2000), and Bakshi and 
Kapadia (2003a).  
Before presenting empirical results, we first review the one-dimensional model and its 
properties. Assume that the price of underlying asset, , follows a one-dimensional diffusion 
process as follows (for simplicity, here we assume that underlying assets do not pay dividend): 
tS
( , ) ( , ) ,             0,                                          (1)t t t tdS S t S dt S t S dB tμ σ= + ≥  
where the drift μ and the volatility σ are deterministic functions of tS nd t, tB  
a standard Brownian motion. All the option pricing models, which are built on the underlying 
prices with one-dimensional diffusion process, must have the following three properties: the 
monotonicity property,
( , )S t   a  is( , )S t  
 the perfect correlation property and the option redundancy property. The 
proof of the monotonicity property is provided by Bergman, Grundy, and Wiener (1996). They 
show that if the underlying asset price process is a one-dimensional diffusion process, as well as 
in certain restricted stochastic volatility models, the option’s Delta is bounded by the infimum and 
supremum of its Delta at maturity, which means 0 C
S
∂≤ ≤∂ 1 for Call and 1 0
P
S
∂− ≤ ≤∂  for Put. 
Moreover, if the option’s payoff is convex (concave), the option’s price is a convex (concave) 
function of the underlying asset’s price. The perfect correlation property is determined by the sole 
source of stochastic variation for all options in a one-dimensional diffusion model. For the option 
redundancy property, we know that an option can always be exactly dynamically replicated by the 
underlying asset and a risk-free bond. The excess gain of a delta-hedged option is zero. 
In order to facilitate our understanding of the nature of the excess gain generated by a 
delta-hedged option, now we present a generic two-factor model. Assuming the underlying asset 
follows the same diffusion process in equation (1), but investors are trading an additional risk 
factor, denoted by  in the warrant market. For example, in the stochastic volatility models, 
including Heston (1993) square-root model,  is a stochastic volatility. The new factor 
( )X t
( )X t
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follows the process 
X
tdX dt dBθ η= + t ,                                           (2) 
where XtB  is a standard Brownian motion that is correlated with  in the underlying process 
with coefficient 
tB
ρ . The warrant price )t , is then a function f  tX  and t . By 
Ito’s lemma, we have a process for the warrant pr
, C S X  o
ice  
( , , tS ,
2 2 2
2 2 2
2 2
1 1
2 2
          .Xt t
C C C C C CdC S S S dt
t S X S X S X
C CS dB dB
S X
μ θ σ η σ ηρ
σ η
⎛ ⎞∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ⎟⎜ ⎟= + + + + +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂⎝ ⎠
∂ ∂+ +∂ ∂
 
A delta-hedged portfolio is defined as , where CΠ= −ΔS C
S
∂Δ≡ ∂ . The excess gain of 
the delta-hedged portfolio is  
2 2 2
2 2 2
2 2
1 1
2 2
                       .                                                                                  (3)Xt
C C C C C Cd r dt rS S S rC dt
t S X S X S X
C dB
X
θ σ η σ ηρ
η
⎛ ⎞∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ⎟⎜ ⎟Π− Π = + + + + + −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂⎝ ⎠
∂+ ∂
 
The risk in the portfolio depends only on the risk in the process of . For example, investor 
trade volatility risk as noted by Bakshi and Kapadia (2003a). The cumulated gain from  to 
, denoted by  is given by 
tX
t
t τ+ ( , )t tπ +τ
τ τ
( , ) ( ) .                           (4)
t t
t t t t
t t C C dS r C S du
τ τ
τπ τ
+ +
++ ≡ − − Δ − −Δ∫ ∫  
If there is only one factor (  in stock price process) traded in the derivatives market, then 
 must be zero. Moreover, if is significantly nonzero, we may conclude that 
there is at least one more additional risk factor  traded in this market. In section 4.3, we will 
use the discrete form of equation (4) to compute the delta-hedged gains. 
tB
( , )t tπ + ( , )t tπ +
tX
 
4.1 Testing the monotonicity property 
Following Bakshi, Cao and Chen (2000), we divide the violations between warrant price 
changes and underlying price changes into four main categories: 
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 Type I violation:    0  0 and 0,  or 0 and 0 ;
                              0  0 and 0,  or 0 and 0 .
S C S C S C
S P S P S P
Δ ×Δ < ⇔ Δ > Δ < Δ < Δ >
Δ ×Δ > ⇔ Δ > Δ > Δ < Δ <  
Type II violation:   0 , but 0 ;
                               0 , but 0 .
S C
S P
Δ ≠ Δ =
Δ ≠ Δ =  
Type III violation:  0,  but 0 ;
                               0,  but 0 .
S C
S P
Δ = Δ ≠
Δ = Δ ≠  
Type IV violation:  1,  0  ;
                                1,  0 .
C S
S
P S
S
Δ > Δ ≠Δ
Δ <− Δ ≠Δ
 
Table 3 presents empirical results on testing the monotonicity property. It shows the 
occurrence rates of four different violations for the 30 expired warrants in Chinese warrant market. 
The results of S&P 500 options by Bakshi, Cao and Chen (2000) are included as a benchmark in 
the last line of each table.  From Table 3, we observe that the total occurrence rate of the four 
types of violations in the Chinese warrant market is higher than 50% for most of the warrants, 
sometimes even higher than 70%, which is much higher than those in the U.S. market (21.4% and 
24.2%). Through the trading in the past two and half years, the violation rates of call warrants are 
decreasing significantly. For example, the total frequency of violations of the call warrant, 
Zhonghua CWB1 (580011) traded on the Shanghai Stock Exchange, is 39.83%. It expired on 
December 17, 2007. Another example is Shenfa SFC1 (031003), an expired (on December 28, 
2007) call warrant traded on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. Its total violation rate is 33.90%. 
Compared with the warrants issued in 2005 or expired in 2006, whose total rates of violations are 
about 60% to 70%, the violation rates of those newly-expired call warrants are decreasing 
significantly. However, the total violation rates of put warrants still remain at a level higher than 
50%, and there is no evidence to show that they are going to decrease. 
Another interesting phenomenon is that, for call warrants, type IV violation is more likely to 
occur than type I violation, which means that call warrant prices are more likely to overreact to 
the price changes of their underlying stocks. Whereas for put warrants, type I violation happens 
much more frequently than type IV violation, which means put warrant prices are more likely to 
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move in the wrong direction when the underlying stock prices changes. For type III violation, its 
occurrence rate in the U.S. is zero, whereas it is significantly above zero in the Chinese warrant 
market. We believe that it is caused by market microstructure, because the minimum tick size in 
the Chinese warrant market is 0.1 cent, but the minimum tick size in the stock market is 1 cent. 
Therefore it appears that warrant prices might change even though the underlying stock prices do 
not. We may conclude from Table 3 that the warrant prices in the Chinese warrant market do not 
support the monotonicity property of the one-dimensional diffusion models. 
 
4.2  Testing the perfect correlation property 
We compute the correlation matrix between the four assets: market warrant prices, 
Black-Scholes warrant prices, underlying stock prices and Shanghai Composite Index. We 
compute the correlation coefficients by using the time series of daily price changes of a warrant 
and its underlying asset. As a robustness test, we compute the correlation by using the 
Black-Scholes prices, which is supposed to be 1 for calls and -1 for puts.  
Table 4 shows the correlation matrix of calls and puts separately. We see that the correlation 
between price changes of warrant and that of the underlying stock is not as high as 1 for calls and 
-1 for puts, different from the requirements of one-dimensional diffusion models. Especially for 
put warrants, the correlations are close to zero, which indicates that investors are trading put 
warrants as independent assets instead of derivatives of their underlying stocks. However, after 
two and half years of trading, the correlation between price changes of call warrants and those of 
underlying stocks increases significantly. For example, for Yager QCB1 (580006) traded on the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange, the correlation coefficient between price changes of the warrant and 
that of its underlying stock is 0.91. Another example is Qiaocheng HQC1 (031001) traded on the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange. The correlation coefficient between price changes of the warrant and 
that of its underlying stock is 0.91. However, there is no evidence that the correlation coefficients 
of the put warrants approach -1. Our result on the correlation between price changes from the 
Black-Scholes formula and that of the underlying stocks is almost 1 for most of the calls. This 
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indicates that our calculation is reliable. These results mean that the put warrants prices in the 
Chinese warrant market do not support the perfect correlation property of one-dimensional 
diffusion models. Their correlations with the underlying stocks are almost zero. Investors are 
trading put warrants as independent assets instead of derivatives of their underlying stocks.  
 
4.3  Testing the option redundancy property 
The cumulated delta-hedged gains defined in equation (4) can be written in a discrete form 
as follows 
1
1 1
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where ,  is the maturity date, and  is the hedge ratio at . The hedge is 
rebalanced daily ( , where 242 is trading days in one year in the Chinese financial 
market), and the option delta is computed as the Black-Scholes hedge ratio, , 
where  is the cumulative normal distribution function, and 
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, with is historical volatility
nt
σ 2 . We calculate the 
cumulated delta-hedged gains  for each warrant over its life time; the delta-hedged 
gains normalized by the initial price of the underlying stock (
( , )t tπ +
( , ) tt t Sπ τ+ , in %), and the initial 
warrant price ( ( , ) tt t Cπ τ+ , in %); and then the occurrence frequency of  (in %) in the 
time series of each delta-hedged portfolio. A warrant is not a redundant asset if the cumulated gain 
is significantly nonzero.  
0dπ<
Table 5 reports the sign and the magnitude of cumulated delta-hedged gains for all the 30 
expired warrants. Column four of the table shows the cash amount of the gains, . 
Columns five and six present the relative amount of the gains, normalized by the initial 
( , )t tπ τ+
                                                 
2 Bates’ (2005) method (to compute a model-free delta by using option prices with different strikes) cannot be 
applied in the Chinese warrant market, since at a certain time we only have one or two strikes for warrants on 
an underlying stock. 
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underlying stock price  and warrant price , in order to make the cumulated delta-hedged 
gains comparable across the time-series and the cross-section. The last column reports the 
occurrence frequency of negative delta-hedged gains over the lifetime of the warrants. 
tS tC
According to Table 5, the delta-hedging strategies lose money for 90% (27 out of 30) of the 
warrants with an average loss of CNY -1.09. “The money left on the table” equals 14.11% of the 
underlying asset value on average, or 46.48% of the warrant price itself. In the U.S. market, for all 
firms, on average, the delta-hedging strategy loses 0.03% of the underlying asset value, and the 
same delta-hedging strategy for the index option has a loss of 0.07% of the underlying index level 
(Bakshi and Kapadia (2003b)). For call warrants, the delta-hedging strategy loses 16.75% of the 
underlying asset value, or 45.70% of the warrant value. For put warrants, the strategy loses 
11.79% of the underlying asset value, or 47.17% of the warrant value. The occurrence frequency 
of negative delta-hedged gains is higher than 50% for both call and put warrants. Our results 
remain robust when the median is taken as the measure of central tendency. The amount of 
negative delta-hedged gains in the Chinese warrant market is much larger than that in the U.S. 
market, because only a small portion of institutions (innovation pilot securities dealers) could take 
short position of warrants in China. They can take “the money left on the table” away by 
constructing the opposite position as the delta-hedging strategy. Since the cumulated delta-hedged 
gain is significantly nonzero, we may conclude that the warrants are not redundant assets in the 
Chinese warrant market. We explore the additional risk factors traded in the warrant market in the 
following. 
 
4.4 The additional risk factors traded in the warrant market: what drives the delta-hedged gains? 
We try to identify the sources of the delta-hedged gains by using OLS regressions on the 
time series of the gains against the 11 possible explanatory variables. The explanatory variables 
include: index return, index volatility, index trading volume, underlying stock return, underlying 
stock volatility with the two measures, underlying stock trading volume and trading value, 
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warrant trading volume and trading value. In particular, the daily volatility is calculated by using 
the Parkinson (1980) measure 
2
1ˆ ln
4 ln 2
t
P
t
H
L
σ ⎛ ⎞⎟⎜ ⎟= ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜⎝ ⎠ , 
and the Rogers and Satchell (1991) measure 
ˆ ln ln ln lnt t tRS
t t t
H H L L
O C O C
σ = + t
t
, 
where , tO tH ,  and  stand for the daily open, high, low and close prices respectively. tL tC
We find that not all of the 11 variables are significant, and decide to report results on four 
variables, that could answer our main concerns. These four variables are: (1) market index return, 
(2) market index daily volatility, (3) underlying stock daily volatility, and (4) warrant trading 
value. Regarding the two different measures of daily volatility, we find that the regression results 
with the two measures are similar to each other. We decide to report the result with only one of 
them, the Parkinson (1980) estimator. In order to obtain an intuitive relation between delta-hedged 
gains and the explanatory variables, we run the following panel data regressions by pooling the 
data of all 14 call warrants or 16 put warrants: 
1 1
2 2
3 3
4 4
GAINS IdxRt ,
GAINS IdxVol ,
GAINS SVol ,
GAINS TrdValue ,
1 2 3 4 1234GAINS IdxRt IdxVol SVol TrdValue ,
α β ε
α β ε
α β ε
α β ε
= + +
= + +
= + +
= + +
α β β β β ε= + + + + +
 
where GAINS is the daily gains of delta-hedged warrants; IdxRt is market index return; IdxVol is 
daily market index volatility; SVol is daily underlying stock volatility; TrdValue is warrant trading 
value.  
Table 6 provides the results of the panel regressions. We observe that the coefficients of 
IdxVol and SVol are significant at 5% level both for calls and puts, which means that the volatility 
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risk is one of the main sources in the delta-hedged gains. The coefficients of market risk (IdxRt) 
are significant at 5% level for calls and the coefficients of TrdValue are significant at 10% level 
for puts, which means that investors are also trading some other risks in the Chinese warrant 
market in addition to the underlying risks. 
Recently, Bakshi, Madan and Panayotov (2010) propose a theory of U-shaped pricing kernel 
for equity. Based on this theory, they have a testable implication for call options: higher the strike, 
lower the return of out-of-the-money (OTM) calls. The return of OTM calls could be negative if 
strike is higher than a certain threshold. The empirical observations from S&P 500 index options 
and international equity options markets support their theory. Because in Chinese warrant market, 
we only have one strike and one maturity (usually one year), it is not possible to perform a similar 
test. 
 
V  Conclusions 
In this paper, we study the newly-developed Chinese warrant market by using the data of all 
the 30 expired warrants (14 calls and 16 puts) between August 22, 2005 and March 14, 2008. Our 
research focuses on the applicability of one-dimensional diffusion models in this new emerging 
derivative market, and the additional risk factors traded in this market. We have the following 
observations: 
The warrants are much over-priced compared with the Black-Scholes prices with historical 
volatility, sometimes more than twice. The implied volatility of the warrants is very high, 
sometimes 100% for calls, and even 1000% for puts, especially for those short-term deeply 
out-of-the-money put warrants. 
Arbitrage can be achieved if investors are allowed to sell the warrants to the market. In fact, 
some institutions (innovation pilot securities dealers), with permissions from the regulators to 
create warrants, are making huge arbitrage profit by creating and selling warrants. Investors lack 
the basic knowledge of warrants, such as their intrinsic value, the zero value of deeply 
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out-of-the-money put. 
One-dimensional diffusion models, including the Black-Scholes model, do not apply in the 
Chinese warrant market. The investors are trading some other risk factors in the Chinese warrant 
market, in addition to the underlying risk. 
The cumulated delta-hedged gains in the Chinese warrant market are significantly negative. 
The negative gains are mainly driven by volatility risk, and the trading value of the warrants (for 
puts), and the market risk (for calls). 
20 
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Table 1: The detailed differences between equity warrants and covered warrants 
 
  Equity warrants Covered warrants 
Issuer 
Listed company 
(the issuer of the underlying assets) 
independent third party 
(usually financial institutions such as investment banks) 
Purpose of 
issuance 
Financing for listed companies 
To provide risk management and investment instruments for 
customers 
The result of 
exercise 
When equity warrants are exercised, the listed company  
must issue new shares and sell them at strike price to  
the warrants holder (take call warrants as an example).  
The total number of outstanding shares is increased  
after exercise of the warrants.  
There is a dilution effect. 
When covered warrants are exercised, if it is stock  
settlement, the warrants issuer just sell stocks to  
warrants holder, if it is cash settlement, the warrants issuer  
just pay the difference between strike price and the 
underlying asset price in cash to the warrants holder.  
The number of outstanding shares will not be changed.  
There is no dilution effect. 
Underlying assets Single stock Single stock, or portfolio of stocks, or index 
Time to expiration usually 1 to 5 years usually 6 months to 2 years 
Settlement deliver stocks deliver stocks, or settled by cash 
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Table 2: Summary statistics of warrants and their underlying stocks. This table shows, for each of the 30 expired warrants, the average daily 
trading volume, the average daily Yuan volume (trading value), daily average market price (close price) and daily average Black-Scholes price, 
daily average time value computed from the market price and Black-Scholes price, daily average implied volatility and historical volatility. The 
t-statistics are in square brackets. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels are denoted by ***, ** and *, respectively. 
 
Call warrants: 
 
    Avg daily trading volume (in million)  Avg daily Yuan volume (trading value) (in million) Avg daily close price of warrant 
Warrant 
code 
Warrant Name warrant 
underlying 
stock 
Avg Diff t of Diff   warrant
underlying 
stock 
Avg Diff t of Diff market price
Black-Scholes 
price 
Avg Diff t of Diff 
580000 Baosteel JTB1 575 46 529 *** [13.65] 736 197 538 *** [10.75] 1.30 0.24 1.06 *** [43.85]
580001 Wuhan steel JTB1 1060 43 1017 *** [18.58] 945 124 821 *** [13.93] 0.81 0.35 0.46 *** [39.28]
580002 BaoSteel JTB1 771 76 695 *** [25.10] 1,139 244 895 *** [17.21] 1.39 1.13 0.25 *** [17.54]
580003 HanSteel JTB1 653 29 623 *** [24.74] 1,307 134 1173 *** [19.19] 1.90 1.60 0.30 *** [18.40]
580004 Shouchuang JTB1 181 21 160 *** [22.68] 532 130 402 *** [17.59] 2.82 1.68 1.14 *** [47.59]
580005 Wanhua HXB1 7 5 2 *** [3.57] 106 113 -7 [-0.96] 19.32 20.58 -1.26 *** [-8.37]
580006 Yager QCB1 70 25 46 *** [14.81] 418 285 134 *** [7.23] 6.34 5.62 0.72 *** [21.84]
580007 Changdian CWB1 120 53 67 *** [13.85] 644 532 112 *** [4.32] 4.56 3.61 0.95 *** [19.20]
580008 Guodian JTB1 151 37 114 *** [19.56] 1,011 418 592 *** [12.90] 6.39 5.59 0.80 *** [21.40]
580009 Yili CWB1 30 11 18 *** [13.33] 698 343 355 *** [9.49] 21.35 21.58 -0.23 *** [-3.47]
580011 Zhonghua CWB1 137 22 115 *** [24.50] 1,553 358 1195 *** [17.06] 10.90 10.08 0.83 *** [8.45]
030001 Ansteel JTC1 77 21 55 *** [16.10] 235 123 112 *** [10.99] 3.02 2.17 0.85 *** [25.24]
031001 Qiaocheng HQC1 30 9 21 *** [18.66] 768 267 502 *** [13.71] 28.23 30.59 -2.36 *** [-14.59]
031003 Shenfa SFC1 53 24 30 *** [7.05] 1,036 875 161 ** [2.10] 19.68 18.50 1.18 *** [5.66]
 Average 280 30 250  795 296 499  9.14 8.81 0.33 
  p-value 0.01 0.00 0.01  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.24  
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    Avg time value of warrant Avg volatility 
Warrant 
code 
Warrant Name 
from market 
price 
from BS price Avg Diff t of Diff implied volatility historical volatility Avg Diff t of Diff 
580000 Baosteel JTB1 1.26 0.21 1.06 *** [43.85] 1.35 0.26 1.09 *** [44.30]
580001 Wuhan steel JTB1 0.73 0.27 0.46 *** [39.28] 1.23 0.43 0.80 *** [26.35]
580002 BaoSteel JTB1 0.52 0.27 0.25 *** [17.54] 1.53 0.72 0.79 *** [19.05]
580003 HanSteel JTB1 0.44 0.14 0.30 *** [18.40] 1.20 0.50 0.71 *** [19.49]
580004 Shouchuang JTB1 1.53 0.39 1.14 *** [47.59] 1.91 0.51 1.40 *** [24.38]
580005 Wanhua HXB1 -1.20 0.06 -1.26 *** [-8.37] 3.72 0.57 3.14 *** [19.48]
580006 Yager QCB1 0.83 0.11 0.72 *** [21.84] 1.84 0.56 1.27 *** [22.49]
580007 Changdian CWB1 1.00 0.05 0.95 *** [19.20] 1.24 0.28 0.97 *** [41.11]
580008 Guodian JTB1 0.99 0.19 0.80 *** [21.40] 1.73 0.52 1.20 *** [19.17]
580009 Yili CWB1 -0.23 0.00 -0.23 *** [-3.47] 1.81 0.46 1.36 *** [17.02]
580011 Zhonghua CWB1 0.96 0.13 0.83 *** [8.45] 1.66 0.56 1.13 *** [31.14]
030001 Ansteel JTC1 0.91 0.07 0.85 *** [25.24] 1.66 0.38 1.28 *** [37.76]
031001 Qiaocheng HQC1 -2.35 0.01 -2.36 *** [-14.59] 1.10 0.57 0.55 *** [32.08]
031003 Shenfa SFC1 1.26 0.09 1.18 *** [5.66] 1.44 0.50 0.92 *** [16.70]
  Average 0.48 0.14 0.33  1.67 0.49 1.18 
  p-value 0.12 0.00 0.24  0.00 0.00 0.00  
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Put warrants: 
 
    Avg daily trading volume (in million)  Avg daily Yuan volume (trading value) (in million) Avg daily close price of warrant 
Warrant 
code 
Warrant Name warrant 
underlying 
stock 
Avg Diff t of Diff   warrant
underlying 
stock 
Avg Diff t of Diff market price
Black-Scholes 
price 
Avg Diff t of Diff 
580990 Maotai JCP1 463 3 460 *** [8.36] 382 229 153 *** [5.32] 1.03 0.66 0.37 *** [11.57]
580991 Haier JTP1 473 16 457 *** [9.75] 306 145 161 *** [7.92] 0.72 0.12 0.61 *** [49.99]
580992 Yager QCP1 550 25 525 *** [10.71] 354 285 69 ** [2.09] 0.68 0.18 0.50 *** [34.32]
580993 Wanhua HXP1 167 5 162 *** [9.39] 221 113 108 *** [7.43] 1.48 0.37 1.12 *** [26.92]
580994 Yuanshui CTP1 383 14 368 *** [9.59] 362 80 282 *** [10.56] 0.99 0.40 0.59 *** [28.93]
580995 Baosteel JTP1 879 76 803 *** [11.35] 485 244 240 *** [7.92] 0.56 0.45 0.11 *** [5.25]
580996 Huchang JTP1 483 13 471 *** [10.54] 453 197 255 *** [9.68] 1.16 1.26 -0.09 ** [-2.03]
580997 Zhaohang CMP1 4,216 79 4137 *** [8.64] 3,171 1,184 1987 *** [4.98] 0.51 0.18 0.33 *** [12.94]
580998 Jichang JTP1 297 8 290 *** [16.27] 339 51 288 *** [16.02] 1.18 0.67 0.50 *** [27.23]
580999 Wuhan steel JTP1 595 43 552 *** [9.635] 371 124 247 *** [8.74] 0.69 0.45 0.24 *** [23.51]
038001 Gangfan PGP1 185 35 149 *** [11.65] 215 178 37 *** [2.85] 1.23 0.84 0.39 *** [16.06]
038002 Wanke HRP1 1,403 50 1354 *** [12.37] 503 285 219 *** [5.02] 0.43 0.15 0.29 *** [26.24]
038003 Hualing JTP1 672 34 638 *** [15.03] 1,407 270 1137 *** [9.90] 1.67 0.60 1.07 *** [16.89]
038005 Shenneng JTP1 590 10 579 *** [10.71] 396 75 320 *** [10.16] 0.81 0.43 0.38 *** [15.88]
038006 Zhongji ZYP1 560 20 540 *** [12.51] 1,424 469 955 *** [6.63] 1.76 0.57 1.19 *** [12.83]
038008 Jiafei JTP1 161 5 156 *** [8.48] 425 145 280 *** [3.79] 1.67 0.30 1.37 *** [25.98]
 Average 755 27 728  676 255 421  1.04 0.48 0.56 
  p-value 0.01 0.00 0.01  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00  
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    Avg time value of warrant Avg volatility 
Warrant code Warrant Name 
from market 
price 
from BS price Avg Diff t of Diff implied volatility historical volatility Avg Diff t of Diff 
580990 Maotai JCP1 1.03 0.66 0.37 *** [11.57] 1.09 0.80 0.29 *** [4.01] 
580991 Haier JTP1 0.72 0.12 0.61 *** [49.99] 1.55 0.31 1.24 *** [13.78] 
580992 Yager QCP1 0.68 0.18 0.50 *** [34.32] 1.79 0.56 1.23 *** [11.66] 
580993 Wanhua HXP1 1.48 0.37 1.12 *** [26.92] 1.92 0.57 1.36 *** [10.76] 
580994 Yuanshui CTP1 0.97 0.38 0.59 *** [28.93] 1.19 0.42 0.76 *** [14.01] 
580995 Baosteel JTP1 0.48 0.37 0.11 *** [5.25] 1.59 0.72 0.86 *** [6.06] 
580996 Huchang JTP1 0.88 0.97 -0.09 ** [-2.03] 0.70 0.40 0.30 *** [4.86] 
580997 Zhaohang CMP1 0.51 0.18 0.33 *** [12.94] 1.57 0.40 1.17 *** [10.85] 
580998 Jichang JTP1 0.89 0.39 0.50 *** [27.23] 0.75 0.29 0.46 *** [9.53] 
580999 Wuhan steel JTP1 0.47 0.23 0.24 *** [23.51] 0.86 0.43 0.43 *** [14.23] 
038001 Gangfan PGP1 0.99 0.61 0.39 *** [16.06] 1.83 0.69 1.16 *** [11.04] 
038002 Wanke HRP1 0.43 0.15 0.29 *** [26.24] 1.19 0.49 0.71 *** [18.68] 
038003 Hualing JTP1 1.27 0.20 1.07 *** [16.89] 1.70 0.40 1.30 *** [16.53] 
038005 Shenneng JTP1 0.80 0.40 0.38 *** [15.88] 0.75 0.41 0.34 *** [18.79] 
038006 Zhongji ZYP1 1.76 0.57 1.19 *** [12.83] 2.11 0.54 1.57 *** [14.32] 
038008 Jiafei JTP1 1.67 0.30 1.37 *** [25.98] 1.60 0.39 1.21 *** [8.12] 
 Average 0.94 0.38 0.56  1.39 0.49 0.90 
  p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00  
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Table 3: Empirical results from testing the monotonicity property of the 30 expired warrants. The last lines of the two tables for call and 
put warrants are the results of S&P 500 options, adopted from Bakshi, Cao, and Chen (2000). 
Call warrants: 
Violation Type I Type IV Type II Type III Sub-categories of Type I 
Wrt Code Wrt Name ΔC*ΔS<0 ΔC/ΔS>1 ΔS<>0, ΔC=0 ΔS=0, ΔC<>0 ΔS<0, ΔC>0 ΔS>0, ΔC<0 
Type I and 
Type IV total
Total 
580000 Baosteel JTB1 33.47% 30.58% 4.55% 7.02% 14.05% 19.42% 64.05% 75.62% 
580001 Wuhan steel JTB1 30.77% 30.34% 0.85% 8.97% 12.82% 17.95% 61.11% 70.94% 
580002 BaoSteel JTB1 18.97% 38.36% 0.43% 6.47% 8.62% 10.34% 57.33% 64.22% 
580003 HanSteel JTB1 21.46% 35.62% 0.43% 4.72% 9.87% 11.59% 57.08% 62.23% 
580004 Shouchuang JTB1 18.45% 36.48% 0.86% 4.29% 6.44% 12.02% 54.94% 60.09% 
580005 Wanhua HXB1 16.17% 43.40% 0.43% 0.85% 9.79% 6.38% 59.57% 60.85% 
580006 Yager QCB1 13.14% 38.14% 0.00% 0.85% 6.36% 6.78% 51.27% 52.12% 
580007 Changdian CWB1 21.37% 26.50% 0.00% 3.85% 10.68% 10.68% 47.86% 51.71% 
580008 Guodian JTB1 17.03% 33.62% 0.87% 1.75% 7.42% 9.61% 50.66% 53.28% 
580009 Yili CWB1 11.91% 32.34% 0.43% 0.85% 5.96% 5.96% 44.26% 45.53% 
580011 Zhonghua CWB1 11.26% 26.41% 0.00% 2.16% 3.46% 7.79% 37.66% 39.83% 
030001 Ansteel JTC1 20.94% 35.47% 0.00% 4.71% 8.55% 12.39% 56.41% 61.11% 
031001 Qiaocheng HQC1 13.24% 25.11% 0.00% 2.74% 8.22% 5.02% 38.36% 41.10% 
031003 Shenfa SFC1 16.95% 15.25% 0.85% 0.85% 8.47% 8.47% 32.20% 33.90% 
Average 18.94% 31.97% 0.69% 3.58% 8.62% 10.32% 50.91% 55.18% 
S&P 500 Calls 9.10% 11.50% 3.60% 0.00% - - 20.60% 24.20% 
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Put warrants: 
Violation Type I Type IV Type II Type III Sub-categories of Type I 
Wrt Code Wrt Name ΔP*ΔS>0 ΔP/ΔS<-1 ΔS<>0, ΔP=0 ΔS=0, ΔP<>0 ΔS>0, ΔP>0 ΔS<0, ΔP<0 
Type I and 
Type IV total
Total 
580990 Maotai JCP1 49.79% 0.86% 1.72% 0.86% 24.03% 25.75% 50.64% 53.22% 
580991 Haier JTP1 48.26% 7.39% 1.30% 3.91% 26.52% 21.74% 55.65% 60.87% 
580992 Yager QCP1 46.61% 5.08% 0.00% 0.85% 27.12% 19.49% 51.69% 52.54% 
580993 Wanhua HXP1 53.19% 3.83% 0.00% 0.85% 29.79% 23.40% 57.02% 57.87% 
580994 Yuanshui CTP1 40.93% 14.51% 0.00% 6.22% 20.73% 20.21% 55.44% 61.66% 
580995 Baosteel JTP1 42.67% 12.93% 1.29% 6.47% 22.84% 19.83% 55.60% 63.36% 
580996 Huchang JTP1 43.16% 4.27% 2.14% 1.28% 20.94% 22.22% 47.44% 50.85% 
580997 Zhaohang CMP1 44.29% 1.67% 2.23% 1.39% 24.79% 19.50% 45.96% 49.58% 
580998 Jichang JTP1 43.78% 18.03% 1.29% 5.15% 22.75% 21.03% 61.80% 68.24% 
580999 Wuhan steel JTP1 44.02% 19.23% 2.14% 8.97% 21.37% 22.65% 63.25% 74.36% 
038001 Gangfan PGP1 42.42% 18.18% 0.61% 4.24% 23.94% 18.48% 60.61% 65.45% 
038002 Wanke HRP1 44.51% 5.78% 1.73% 2.89% 21.97% 22.54% 50.29% 54.91% 
038003 Hualing JTP1 37.00% 15.47% 1.79% 2.24% 20.63% 16.37% 52.47% 56.50% 
038005 Shenneng JTP1 42.57% 14.85% 0.99% 3.96% 18.81% 23.76% 57.43% 62.38% 
038006 Zhongji ZYP1 47.47% 5.62% 1.97% 0.56% 25.56% 21.91% 53.09% 55.62% 
038008 Jiafei JTP1 47.04% 6.36% 1.69% 2.54% 27.97% 19.07% 53.39% 57.63% 
Average 44.86% 9.63% 1.31% 3.27% 23.73% 21.12% 54.49% 59.07% 
S&P 500 Puts 5.40% 13.20% 2.80% 0.00% - - 18.60% 21.40% 
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Table 4: Empirical results from testing the perfect correlation property of the 30 expired warrants. The correlation coefficients are 
computed from the time series of daily price changes. Above the dashed line are the warrants traded on the Shanghai Stock Exchange. Below the 
dashed line are the warrants traded on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. 
 
Call warrants: 
 
Correlation Δ S Δ S Δ warrant   
Warrant Code Warrant Name Δ warrant Δ BS Price Δ Index Initial trading day Expiration day 
580000 Baosteel JTB1 0.30  0.93  0.14  2005-08-22 2006-08-30 
580001 Wuhan steel JTB1 0.57  0.93  0.22  2005-11-23 2006-11-22 
580002 BaoSteel JTB1 0.84  0.99  0.50  2006-03-31 2007-03-30 
580003 HanSteel JTB1 0.78  0.99  0.54  2006-04-05 2007-04-04 
580004 Shouchuang JTB1 0.78  0.95  0.52  2006-04-24 2007-04-23 
580005 Wanhua HXB1 0.75  0.89  0.59  2006-04-27 2007-04-26 
580006 Yager QCB1 0.91  1.00  0.61  2006-05-22 2007-05-21 
580007 Changdian CWB1 0.79  1.00  0.55  2006-05-25 2007-05-24 
580008 Guodian JTB1 0.86  1.00  0.57  2006-09-05 2007-09-04 
580009 Yili CWB1 0.87  1.00  0.61  2006-11-15 2007-11-14 
580011 Zhonghua CWB1 0.88  1.00  0.62  2006-12-18 2007-12-17 
030001 Ansteel JTC1 0.67  0.99  0.46  2005-12-05 2006-12-05 
031001 Qiaocheng HQC1 0.91  1.00  0.27  2006-11-24 2007-11-23 
031003 Shenfa SFC1 0.79  1.00  0.55  2007-06-29 2007-12-28 
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Put warrants: 
 
Correlation Δ S Δ S Δ warrant   
Warrant Code Warrant Name Δ warrant Δ BS Price Δ Index Initial trading day Expiration day 
580990 Maotai JCP1 -0.00  -0.43  -0.06  2006-05-30 2007-05-29 
580991 Haier JTP1 -0.06  -0.16  -0.14  2006-05-17 2007-05-16 
580992 Yager QCP1 -0.04  -0.29  -0.11  2006-05-22 2007-05-21 
580993 Wanhua HXP1 0.13  -0.60  0.09  2006-04-27 2007-04-26 
580994 Yuanshui CTP1 0.02  -0.81  0.08  2006-04-19 2007-02-12 
580995 Baosteel JTP1 0.03  -0.44  -0.07  2006-03-31 2007-03-30 
580996 Huchang JTP1 0.10  -0.46  0.10  2006-03-07 2007-03-06 
580997 Zhaohang CMP1 -0.03  -0.16  -0.06  2006-03-02 2007-09-01 
580998 Jichang JTP1 -0.14  -0.82  -0.10  2005-12-23 2006-12-22 
580999 Wuhan steel JTP1 0.18  -0.76  -0.01  2005-11-23 2006-11-22 
038001 Gangfan PGP1 -0.16  -0.67  -0.12  2005-11-04 2007-05-03 
038002 Wanke HRP1 -0.02  -0.56  0.03  2005-12-05 2006-09-04 
038003 Hualing JTP1 -0.19  -0.28  -0.13  2006-03-02 2008-03-01 
038005 Shenneng JTP1 -0.08  -0.89  0.06  2006-04-27 2006-10-26 
038006 Zhongji ZYP1 -0.08  -0.16  -0.22  2006-05-25 2007-11-23 
038008 Jiafei JTP1 0.05  -0.36  -0.08  2006-06-30 2007-06-29 
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Table 5: The sign and magnitude of cumulated delta-hedged gains. We compute the 
cumulated gains on delta-hedged portfolios: (1) a long call position, hedged by a short position in 
the underlying stock, or (2) a long put position, hedged by a long position in the underlying stock, 
with the net investment earning the risk-free rate. For example, the cumulated delta-hedged gain 
of a call warrant is given by 
1
1 1
0 0
( , ) ( ) ( )
n n n n n n
N N
t t t t t t t t
n n
t t C C S S r C S
Nτ
τπ τ
+
− −
+
= =
+ = − − Δ − − −Δ∑ ∑  
which is used by Bakshi and Kapadia (2003b). The portfolio is re-balanced daily ( =1/242), 
and the  is computed as the Black-Scholes hedge ratio, evaluated at the historical volatility, 
which has been defined in Section IV. Column four is the cash amount of the gains. Column five 
and six are the relative amount of the gains, normalized by the initial underlying stock price and 
warrant price. Column seven is the occurrence frequency of negative daily gains over the lifetime 
of the warrant.  
/ Nτ
nt
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Call warrants: 
Wrt Code Wrt Name OBS 
Cumulated 
Delta-Hedged 
Gains (π) 
Magnitude of 
π/S 
Magnitude of 
π/C 
Frequency of  
dπ<0 
580000 Baosteel JTB1 242 -0.60  -12.89% -47.35% 56.20% 
580001 Wuhan steel JTB1 234 -0.71  -25.73% -86.70% 55.13% 
580002 BaoSteel JTB1 232 -0.47  -22.58% -81.18% 52.16% 
580003 HanSteel JTB1 233 -0.46  -14.94% -57.91% 50.64% 
580004 Shouchuang JTB1 233 -1.11  -24.84% -69.60% 57.08% 
580005 Wanhua HXB1 235 1.97  11.97% 19.18% 50.64% 
580006 Yager QCB1 236 -0.82  -12.00% -24.41% 52.97% 
580007 Changdian CWB1 234 -1.71  -24.25% -53.16% 55.56% 
580008 Guodian JTB1 229 -0.93  -17.65% -52.20% 51.97% 
580009 Yili CWB1 235 -3.06  -16.77% -23.91% 53.19% 
580011 Zhonghua CWB1 231 -1.31  -18.42% -54.17% 51.95% 
030001 Ansteel JTC1 234 -0.63  -15.06% -39.42% 57.27% 
031001 Qiaocheng HQC1 219 -3.34  -18.80% -28.09% 47.03% 
031003 Shenfa SFC1 118 -6.22  -22.62% -40.84% 53.39% 
  Mean   -1.39  -16.75% -45.70% 53.23% 
 Median   -0.87  -18.04% -49.78% 53.08% 
Standard Deviation 1.87  0.09  0.27  0.03  
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Put warrants: 
Wrt Code Wrt Name OBS 
Cumulated 
Delta-Hedged 
Gains (π) 
Magnitude of 
π/S 
Magnitude of 
π/P 
Frequency of  
dπ<0 
580990 Maotai JCP1 233 -0.78  -1.62% -51.34% 49.36% 
580991 Haier JTP1 230 -0.84  -17.73% -80.11% 50.43% 
580992 Yager QCP1 236 -0.79  -11.61% -82.09% 48.31% 
580993 Wanhua HXP1 235 -2.31  -14.06% -70.80% 47.66% 
580994 Yuanshui CTP1 193 -0.45  -10.57% -35.29% 51.30% 
580995 Baosteel JTP1 232 -0.18  -8.73% -30.11% 47.84% 
580996 Huchang JTP1 234 0.32  2.69% 16.73% 51.28% 
580997 Zhaohang CMP1 359 0.07  1.10% 12.14% 49.58% 
580998 Jichang JTP1 233 -1.04  -15.42% -56.42% 53.65% 
580999 Wuhan steel JTP1 234 -0.84  -30.28% -72.30% 51.28% 
038001 Gangfan PGP1 330 -0.96  -29.08% -49.29% 47.88% 
038002 Wanke HRP1 173 -0.27  -7.25% -31.61% 53.18% 
038003 Hualing JTP1 446 -0.29  -8.08% -17.87% 49.55% 
038005 Shenneng JTP1 101 -0.73  -11.61% -50.14% 58.42% 
038006 Zhongji ZYP1 356 -2.28  -16.28% -85.89% 46.07% 
038008 Jiafei JTP1 236 -2.05  -10.11% -70.32% 46.61% 
  Mean   -0.84  -11.79% -47.17% 50.15% 
 Median   -0.79  -11.09% -50.74% 49.57% 
Standard Deviation 0.78  0.09  0.31  0.03  
 
 
 
Call and Put warrants in total: 
All warrants 
Cumulated 
Delta-Hedged 
Gains (π) 
Magnitude of 
π/S 
Magnitude of 
π/warrant 
Frequency of  
dπ<0 
Mean -1.09  -14.11% -46.48% 51.59% 
Median -0.80  -15.00% -50.74% 51.29% 
Standard Deviation 1.40  0.09  0.29  0.03  
 
 
Table 6: Panel regressions on daily delta-hedged gains against possible explanatory 
variables. This table reports the coefficients estimates and Newey-West (1987) t-statistics with 21 
lags (in square brackets) of the panel data regressions. GAINS is the daily gains of delta-hedged 
warrants pooled from 14 call warrants or 16 put warrants; IdxRt is market index return; IdxVol is 
daily market index volatility; SVol is the daily underlying stock volatility; TrdValue is the warrant 
trading value. We report the empirical results in two panels (one for calls and the other for puts). 
Statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels are denoted by ***, ** and *, respectively. 
1 1
2 2
3 3
4 4
1 2 3 4 1234
(1) GAINS IdxRt  
(2) GAINS IdxVol  
(3) GAINS SVol  
(4) GAINS TrdValue  
(5) GAINS IdxRt IdxVol SVol TrdValue
α β ε
α β ε
α β ε
α β ε
α β β β β
= + +
= + +
= + +
= + +
= + + + + +ε
 
Call warrants:  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Gains IdxRt IdxVol SVol TrdValue All 
α 0.00 -0.06 *** -0.01 -0.00 -0.02 
  [0.05] [-3.73] [-0.91] [-0.01] [-1.34] 
β1 (IdxRt) -1.79 ***    -1.59 ** 
  [-2.80]    [-2.37] 
β2 (IdxVol)  3.54 ***   4.54 *** 
   [3.32]   [3.51] 
β3 (SVol)   0.21  -1.36 ** 
    [0.40]  [-2.04] 
β4 (TrdValue)    -0.01 -0.01 
     [-0.88] [-0.65] 
# warrants 14 14 14 14 14 
OBS 3145 3145 3145 3145 3145 
Put warrants: 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Gains IdxRt IdxVol SVol TrdValue All 
α -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 *** -0.01 *** -0.01 * 
  [-1.29] [-0.39] [-2.77] [-3.37] [-1.77] 
β1 (IdxRt) 0.05    0.07 
  [0.18]    [0.26] 
β2 (IdxVol)  -0.10   -1.18 ** 
   [-0.22]   [-2.06] 
β3 (SVol)   0.42 *  0.71 *** 
    [1.94]  [2.75] 
β4 (TrdValue)    0.01 * 0.01 * 
     [1.69] [1.74] 
# warrants 16 16 16 16 16 
OBS 4061 4061 4061 4061 4061 
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Figure 1: The market prices, Black-Scholes prices and trading value of Baosteel JTB1 
(580000) 
 
Figure 1a: A comparison between market prices of a warrant and its Black-Scholes prices 
with historical volatility. The Black-Scholes price is computed from the Black-Scholes formula 
with historical volatility. The historical volatility on any date is computed as the standard 
deviation of log stock price returns in a moving window of fixed length. The length of the moving 
window is determined as the time to expiration of the warrant at its initial trading date.  
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Figure 1b: A comparison between the daily trading value of a warrant and that of its 
underlying stock. The unit of trading value is CNY. The daily trading value of a warrant is 
consistently higher than that of its underlying stock 
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Figure 2: The market prices, Black-Scholes prices and trading value of Zhaohang CMP1 
(580997). The deeply out-of-the-money put warrant is heavily over-priced in the few months 
before the maturity date. Its price dynamics is highly correlated with its trading values. 
 
 
Market Price vs Black Scholes Price
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
2005-12-14 2006-3-24 2006-7-2 2006-10-10 2007-1-18 2007-4-28 2007-8-6 2007-11-14
Market Price Black-Scholes Price
 
 
 
 
Underlying and Warrant Trading Value
0
5,000,000,000
10,000,000,000
15,000,000,000
20,000,000,000
25,000,000,000
30,000,000,000
35,000,000,000
40,000,000,000
45,000,000,000
50,000,000,000
14/12/2005 24/3/2006 2/7/2006 10/10/2006 18/1/2007 28/4/2007 6/8/2007 14/11/2007
Underlying Trading Value Warrant Trading Value  
 
 
 
 
 35
Figure 3: Time value and implied volatility of Zhonghua CWB1 (580011) 
 
Figure 3a: A comparison between the time values of warrants computed from their market 
prices and those computed from their Black-Scholes prices. Time value is defined as the 
difference between the price of a warrant and its intrinsic value. The intrinsic value of a warrant 
is  for call, and max( ,0)rS Ke τ−− max( ,0)rKe Sτ− −  for put.  
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Figure 3b: A comparison between implied volatility and historical volatility. Implied 
volatility is defined as the one that equals the Black-Scholes price to the market price. The 
historical volatility on any date is computed as the standard deviation of log stock price returns in 
a moving window of fixed length. The length of the moving window is determined as the time to 
expiration of the warrant at its initial trading date. The broken line indicates that the implied 
volatility cannot be computed on these days due to the fact that the market prices are lower than 
the intrinsic values. 
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Appendix: Overview of the Chinese warrant market. Up until March 14, 2008, there were totally 47 warrants traded on the Shanghai and 
Shenzhen markets. Among these warrants, 30 were expired and 17 were still being traded at that point in time. This table shows, for each of the 
47 warrants, its trading code (ticker), name, underlying stock code (ticker), underlying stock name, exchanges (in column 6, with header “Ex”, 
where “SH” stands for Shanghai Stock Exchange, and “SZ” for Shenzhen Stock Exchange), categories (in column 7, with header “C/P”, where 
“C” stands for call and “P” for put; in column 8, with header “A/B/E”, where “A” stands for American, “E” for European, and “B” for Bermuda; 
in column 9, with header “Covered/Equity”, meaning covered warrant or equity warrant), maturity (including the start day for trading and end 
day for exercise; column 12, with header “TTM (days)”, which stands for days to maturity at the initial issuance time; column 13, with header 
“Exp Y/N”, which means whether the warrant was expired or not up until March 14, 2008), initial strike price and exercise ratio and the ones 
updated to March 14, 2008. 
 
       Category Maturity Initial items Updated items 
# 
Warrant 
code Warrant Name 
Stock 
code Stock Name Ex C/P A/B/E 
Covered 
/ Equity
Start date 
for trading
End date for 
exercise
TTM 
(days)
Exp 
Y/N Strike
Exercise 
Ratio Strike 
Exercise 
Ratio 
1 580000 Baosteel JTB1 600019 Baoshan Iron & Steel Co., Ltd. SH C E Covered 2005-08-22 2006-08-30 378 Y 4.50 1 4.20 1 
2 580001 Wuhan steel JTB1 600005 Wuhan Iron and Steel Co., Ltd. SH C E Covered 2005-11-23 2006-11-22 365 Y 2.90 1 2.62 1 
3 580002 Baosteel JTB1 600010 Inner Mongolia BaoTou Steel Union Co., Ltd. SH C E Covered 2006-03-31 2007-03-30 365 Y 2.00 1 1.94 1 
4 580003 Hansteel JTB1 600001 Handan Iron & Steel Co., Ltd. (HDIS) SH C E Covered 2006-04-05 2007-04-04 365 Y 2.80 1 2.73 1 
5 580004 Shouchuang JTB1 600008 Beijing Capital Co., Ltd. SH C E Covered 2006-04-24 2007-04-23 365 Y 4.55 1 4.40 1 
6 580005 Wanhua HXB1 600309 Yantai Wanhua Polyurethanes Co., Ltd. SH C E Covered 2006-04-27 2007-04-26 365 Y 9.00 1 6.38 1.4097 
7 580006 Yager QCB1 600177 Youngor Group Co., Ltd. SH C E Covered 2006-05-22 2007-05-21 365 Y 3.80 1 3.66 1 
8 580007 Changdian CWB1 600900 China Yangtze Power Co., Ltd. (CYPC) SH C E Equity 2006-05-25 2007-05-24 365 Y 5.50 1 5.35 1 
9 580008 Guodian JTB1 600795 GD Power Development Co., Ltd. SH C E Covered 2006-09-05 2007-09-04 365 Y 4.80 1 4.77 1 
10 580009 Yili CWB1 600887 Inner Mongolia Yili Industrial Group Co., Ltd.  SH C E Equity 2006-11-15 2007-11-14 365 Y 8.00 1 7.97 1 
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       Category Maturity Initial items Updated items 
# 
Warrant 
code Warrant Name 
Stock 
code Stock Name Ex C/P A/B/E 
Covered 
/ Equity
Start date 
for trading
End date for 
exercise
TTM 
(days)
Exp 
Y/N Strike
Exercise 
Ratio Strike 
Exercise 
Ratio 
11 580010 Masteel CWB1 600808 Maanshan Iron & Steel Company Limited SH C E Equity 2006-11-29 2008-11-28 730 N 3.40 1 3.33 1 
12 580011 Zhonghua CWB1 600500 Sinochem International Corporation SH C E Equity 2006-12-18 2007-12-17 365 Y 6.58 1 6.52 1 
13 580012 Yunhua CWB1 600096 Yunnan Yuntianhua Co., Ltd. (YYTH) SH C E Equity 2007-03-08 2009-03-07 730 N 18.23 1 17.95 1 
14 580013 Wuhan steel CWB1 600005 Wuhan Iron and Steel Co., Ltd. SH C E Equity 2007-04-17 2009-04-16 730 N 10.20 1 9.91 1 
15 580014 Shengao CWB1 600548 Shenzhen Expressway Company Limited SH C E Equity 2007-10-30 2009-10-29 730 N 13.85 1 13.85 1 
16 580015 Rizhao CWB1 600017 Rizhao Port Co., Ltd SH C E Equity 2007-12-12 2008-12-02 356 N 14.25 1 14.25 1 
17 580016 Shangqi CWB1 600104 SAIC Motor Corporation Ltd.  SH C E Equity 2008-01-08 2010-01-07 730 N 27.43 1 27.43 1 
18 580017 Ganyue CWB1 600269 Jiangxi Ganyue Expressway CO.,LTD. SH C B Equity 2008-02-28 2010-02-28 731 N 20.88 1 20.88 1 
19 580018 Zhongyuan CWB1 600428 Cosco Shipping Company Limited SH C E Equity 2008-02-26 2009-08-25 546 N 40.38 0.5 40.38 0.5 
20 580019 Shihua CWB1 600028 China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation  SH C E Equity 2008-03-04 2010-03-03 729 N 19.68 0.5 19.68 0.5 
21 580020 Shanggang CWB1 600018 Shanghai International Port (Group) Co., Ltd. SH C E Equity 2008-03-07 2009-03-06 364 N 8.40 1 8.40 1 
22 580989 Nanhang JTP1 600029 China Southern Airlines Company Limited SH P E Covered 2007-06-21 2008-06-20 365 N 7.43 0.5 7.43 0.5 
23 580990 Maotai JCP1 600519 Kweichow Moutai Co., Ltd. SH P E Covered 2006-05-30 2007-05-29 365 Y 30.30 0.25 30.30 0.25 
24 580991 Haier JTP1 600690 Qingdao Haier Co., Ltd. SH P E Covered 2006-05-17 2007-05-16 365 Y 4.39 1 4.29 1 
25 580992 Yager QCP1 600177 Youngor Group Co., Ltd. SH P E Covered 2006-05-22 2007-05-21 365 Y 4.25 1 4.09 1 
26 580993 Wanhua HXP1 600309 Yantai Wanhua Polyurethanes Co., Ltd. SH P E Covered 2006-04-27 2007-04-26 365 Y 13.00 1 9.22 1.4097 
27 580994 Yuanshui CTP1 600649 Shanghai Municipal Raw Water Co., Ltd. SH P E Covered 2006-04-19 2007-02-12 300 Y 5.00 1 4.90 1 
28 580995 Baosteel JTP1 600010 Inner Mongolia BaoTou Steel Union Co., Ltd. SH P E Covered 2006-03-31 2007-03-30 365 Y 2.45 1 2.37 1 
29 580996 Huchang JTP1 600009 Shanghai International Airport Co., Ltd. (SIA) SH P E Covered 2006-03-07 2007-03-06 365 Y 13.60 1 13.36 1 
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       Category Maturity Initial items Updated items 
# 
Warrant 
code Warrant Name 
Stock 
code Stock Name Ex C/P A/B/E 
Covered 
/ Equity
Start date 
for trading
End date 
for exercise
TTM 
(days)
Exp 
Y/N Strike
Exercise 
Ratio Strike 
Exercise 
Ratio 
30 580997 Zhaohang CMP1 600036 China Merchants Bank Co., Ltd. SH P E Covered 2006-03-02 2007-09-01 549 Y 5.65 1 5.45 1 
31 580998 Jichang JTP1 600004 Guangzhou Baiyun International Airport Co., Ltd. SH P A Covered 2005-12-23 2006-12-22 365 Y 7.00 1 6.90 1 
32 580999 Wuhan steel JTP1 600005 Wuhan Iron and Steel Co., Ltd. SH P E Covered 2005-11-23 2006-11-22 365 Y 3.13 1 2.83 1 
33 030001 Ansteel JTC1 000898 Angang Steel Company Limited SZ C E Covered 2005-12-05 2006-12-05 366 Y 3.60 1 3.39 1 
34 030002 Wuliang YGC1 000858 Wuliangye Yibin Co., Ltd. SZ C B Covered 2006-04-03 2008-04-02 731 N 6.93 1 4.90 1.4023 
35 031001 Qiaocheng HQC1 000069 Shenzhen Overseas Chinese Town Holding Company SZ C B Equity 2006-11-24 2007-11-23 365 Y 7.00 1 6.96 1 
36 031002 Gangfan GFC1 000629 Panzhihua New Steel & Vanadium Company Limited SZ C B Equity 2006-12-12 2008-12-11 730 N 3.95 1 3.27 1.209 
37 031003 Shenfa SFC1 000001 Shenzhen Development Bank Co., Ltd. SZ C B Equity 2007-06-29 2007-12-28 183 Y 19.00 1 19.00 1 
38 031004 Shenfa SFC2 000001 Shenzhen Development Bank Co., Ltd. SZ C B Equity 2007-06-29 2008-06-27 365 N 19.00 1 19.00 1 
39 031005 Guoan GAC1 000839 CITIC Guoan Information Industry Co., Ltd. SZ C E Equity 2007-09-25 2009-09-25 731 N 35.50 0.5 35.50 0.5 
40 031006 Zhongxing ZXC1 000063 ZTE Corporation SZ C E Equity 2008-02-22 2010-02-21 730 N 78.13 0.5 78.13 0.5 
41 038001 Gangfan PGP1 000629 Panzhihua New Steel & Vanadium Company Limited SZ P E Covered 2005-11-04 2007-05-03 546 Y 4.85 1 3.16 1.5349 
42 038002 Wanke HRP1 000002 China Vanke Co., Ltd. SZ P B Covered 2005-12-05 2006-09-04 274 Y 3.73 1 3.64 1 
43 038003 Hualing JTP1 000932 Hunan Valin Steel Tube & Wire Co., Ltd. SZ P E Covered 2006-03-02 2008-03-01 731 Y 4.90 1 4.72 1 
44 038004 Wuliang YGP1 000858 Wuliangye Yibin Co., Ltd. SZ P B Covered 2006-04-03 2008-04-02 731 N 7.96 1 5.63 1.4023 
45 038005 Shenneng JTP1 000027 Shenzhen Energy Investment Co., Ltd. (SEIC) SZ P B Covered 2006-04-27 2006-10-26 183 Y 7.12 1 6.69 1 
46 038006 Zhongji ZYP1 000039 China International Marine Containers (Group) Co., Ltd. SZ P B Covered 2006-05-25 2007-11-23 548 Y 10.00 1 7.30 1.37 
47 038008 Jiafei JTP1 000792 Qinghai Salt Lake Potash Company Limited SZ P B Covered 2006-06-30 2007-06-29 365 Y 15.10 1 15.10 1 
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